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TOWARD A STANDARD FOR A FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE
CLAIM UNDER THE NEW JERSEY LAW AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION
Andrew J. Obergfell*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Victor v. State, the New Jersey Supreme Court was called upon
to decide whether a claim of failure to accommodate a disability under
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) required the
plaintiff to prove, as part of the prima facie case, that he suffered an
adverse employment consequence as a result of his employer failing to
accommodate the disability, or whether simply failing to accommodate
the disability was sufficient to warrant an actionable claim under the
LAD.1
The plaintiff, Roy Victor, brought a claim against the State of New
Jersey, the New Jersey State Police, and certain individual defendants,
alleging, inter alia, failure to accommodate under the LAD.2 Victor’s
case involved an unusual set of circumstances; namely that Victor, after
returning from disability leave for a back injury, claimed to have reaggravated his injury, rendering him unable to fulfill his duties as a
state trooper on road patrol.3 As a result, Victor requested an
accommodation in the form of performing administrative tasks rather
than his normal duties.4 Because Victor had been medically cleared
for full duty status, his supervisor required him to undertake his
normal duties.5 The result was a four-hour period during which Victor
was required to perform full duties despite his request for an
accommodation.6 Victor was not discharged or demoted, nor did he
claim constructive discharge.7 Thus, the question arose as to whether

*

J.D., 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Drew University.
1
See Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2010).
2
Id. at 389–90.
3
Id. at 391–92.
4
Id. at 392.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 393.
7
See generally Victor, 203 N.J. 383.
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this four-hour period, during which Victor was required to perform his
full duties without an accommodation, constituted an actionable claim
under the LAD for failure to accommodate, even though he did not
suffer an adverse employment consequence.
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s ruling that an
adverse employment consequence “is presumed by the failure to
accommodate or that plaintiff’s claimed psychological suffering
unequivocally qualifies.”8 Instead, the Appellate Division held that the
jury charge, which failed to “require a finding that plaintiff suffered an
adverse employment action,” was insufficient because an adverse
employment consequence must be found in order to establish a claim
of failure to accommodate under the LAD.9 The New Jersey Supreme
Court was set to provide a definitive answer to the question yet failed
to do so, holding instead that Victor could establish neither that he was
disabled on December 11, 2003 nor that he sought a reasonable
accommodation.10
Thus, the question remains unresolved.
Importantly, the court included dicta which strongly suggested that no
additional adverse employment consequence would be needed to state
a prima facie case.11
After the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in Victor, there has
been considerable disagreement among courts in New Jersey as to how
to apply the prima facie case for failure to accommodate under the LAD.
This disagreement stems from the court’s failure to decide the core
question while offering dicta that no adverse employment consequence
would be necessary to state a prima facie case. As will be discussed infra,
some courts have continued to require proof of an adverse
employment consequence, while others have relied on the court’s
suggestion in dicta and have omitted the adverse employment
consequence element entirely.
This Comment examines the divergent lines of cases stemming
from the Victor decision and argues that under the proper construction
of the LAD, and as a matter of public policy, the court in Victor was
correct to suggest that no adverse employment consequence should be
necessary to support a claim of failure to accommodate under the
LAD. Part II of this Comment examines the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination in the context of disability discrimination. This section
8

Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596, 617 (App. Div. 2008), aff’d as modified, 203
N.J. 383 (2010).
9
Id.
10
Victor, 203 N.J. at 422–23.
11
See id. at 421–22. .
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also examines the failure to accommodate issue under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), to which New Jersey courts look for
guidance.12 Part II concludes with a more thorough analysis of the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Victor and its conflict with the
Appellate Division. Part III examines Victor’s effect on failure to
accommodate jurisprudence under the LAD. It surveys two divergent
lines of cases that have developed since the Victor decision, one of
which views an adverse employment consequence as necessary and one
of which, relying on the Supreme Court’s language in dicta, omits this
element. Part IV begins by urging the New Jersey Supreme Court to
grant certification to decide this important question, because courts
have struggled with the issue of how to articulate the prima facie case
after Victor. It also considers the remedy to which the employee should
be entitled if no adverse employment consequence is necessary.
Further, Part IV argues that interpreting the LAD to require an adverse
employment consequence restricts the duty to accommodate to those
accommodations necessary to perform the job. Such an interpretation
is out of line with prevailing interpretations of the LAD and,
additionally, with the ADA. Part V concludes that failing to
accommodate the disability, even without an adverse employment
consequence, should be an actionable claim under the LAD.
II. THE LAD, THE ADA, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION, AND FAILURE TO
ACCOMMODATE IN LIGHT OF VICTOR
A. The LAD
In passing the LAD, the New Jersey Legislature found that:
[P]ractices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants,
because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age,
sex, gender identity or expression, affectional or sexual
orientation, marital status, familial status, liability for service
in the Armed Forces of the United States, disability or
nationality, are matters of concern to the government of the
State, and that such discrimination threatens not only the
rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the State
but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free
democratic State[.]13
The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that it is “the clear public
policy of this State . . . to abolish discrimination in the work place.
12
13

Victor, 401 N.J. Super. at 612.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (2007).
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Indeed, the overarching goal of the Law is nothing less than the
eradication ‘of the cancer of discrimination.’”14
The New Jersey legislature enacted the LAD in 1945, which, at the
time, did not provide protections for those with disabilities; such
protections did not appear until 1972.15 In that year, a new subsection
of the LAD was enacted to extend the statute’s reach to cover persons
with physical disabilities.16 It stated that the provision was to be
construed to “prohibit any unlawful discrimination against any person
because such person is or has been at any time disabled or any unlawful
employment practice against such person, unless the nature and
extent of the disability reasonably precludes the performance of the
particular employment.”17 Thus, at the outset, people with disabilities
were given their own statutory protection rather than being added as
a protected class under the more general provisions of the statute.18
Moreover, protection for disabled persons was limited by the
individual’s ability to perform the functions of his or her
employment.19 In Victor, the court explained that “unlike other
protected classes, a person’s physical disability might interfere with full
and unfettered equal treatment.”20 Since the time that protection for
disabled persons was recognized, the statute has been amended to
include additional protections.21 For example, in 1978, the Legislature
expanded the statute by eliminating the requirement of a physical
disability and by including certain mental and psychological
disabilities.22
It was not until 2003 that the LAD was expanded to include
“disability” as a protected status akin to the original protected classes.23
Under the LAD, the legislature defined disability to include physical
disabilities, “mental, psychological, or developmental” disabilities, and
AIDS or HIV infection.24 Despite defining the term “disability,” and
14

Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334 (1988) (quoting Jackson v. Concord Co.,
54 N.J. 113, 124 (1969)).
15
Victor, 203 N.J. at 398 (citing 1972 N.J. Laws Ch. 114).
16
Id.
17
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (2004).
18
Victor, 203 N.J. at 399.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 400.
22
1978 N.J. Laws Ch. 137 § 3; see also Victor, 203 N.J. at 400.
23
2003 N.J. Laws Ch. 180 § 4.
24
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (2010). The statute provides greater clarity by
defining disability as:
physical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is
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despite the ADA’s earlier recognition of failure to accommodate as a
subset of disability discrimination, the LAD itself does not include the
term “failure to accommodate.” Rather, that term appears in the
regulations supplementing the statute.25
N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll
employers shall conduct their employment procedures in such a
manner as to assure that all people with disabilities are given equal
consideration with people who do not have disabilities for all aspects
of employment . . . .”26 The term “all aspects of employment” includes
“hiring, promotion, tenure, training, assignment, transfers, and leaves
on the basis of their qualifications and abilities.”27 The reasonable
accommodation language appears in N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b), which
states that “[a]n employer must make a reasonable accommodation to
the limitations of a[n] employee . . . who is a person with a disability,
unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of its business.”28 The
caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy and
other seizure disorders, and which shall include, but not be limited to,
any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination,
blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment,
muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a service or
guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device, or any
mental, psychological or developmental disability, including autism
spectrum disorders, resulting from anatomical, psychological,
physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the normal
exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, medically
or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques. Disability shall also mean AIDS or HIV infection.
Id.
25

See Potente v. Cnty. of Hudson, 187 N.J. 103, 110–11 (2006).
Administrative regulations set out the specific requirements of the
reasonable accommodation process mandated by the LAD. In brief,
unless it would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the
business, N.J.A.C. 13:13–2.5(b) requires an employer to make a
‘reasonable accommodation to the limitations of an employee . . . who
is a person with a disability.’ However, an employer is not required to
take action ‘where it can reasonably be determined that an . . . employee,
as a result of the individual’s disability, cannot perform the essential
function of the job even with reasonable accommodation.’

Id.
See also Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of the Superior Court of N.J., 351 N.J. Super. 385, 396
(App. Div. 2002) (“The LAD does not specifically address reasonable accommodation,
but our courts have uniformly held that the law nevertheless requires an employer to
reasonably accommodate an employee’s handicap.”)
26
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:13-2.5 (2012).
27
Id.
28
Id.
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determination of whether an employer failed to make a reasonable
accommodation is made on a case-by-case basis.29
To determine whether an accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the employer, the following factors must be
examined:
The overall size of the employer’s business with respect to the
number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size
of budget; [t]he type of the employer’s operations, including
the composition and structure of the employer’s workforce;
[t]he nature and cost of the accommodation needed, taking
into consideration the availability of tax credits and
deductions and/or outside funding; and [t]he extent to
which accommodation would involve waiver of an essential
requirement of a job as opposed to a tangential or nonbusiness necessity requirement.30
Such is the general statutory framework regarding a claim of failure to
accommodate under the LAD. Before examining New Jersey case law
under the LAD, it is instructive to first undertake an inquiry of the
pertinent ADA provisions.
B. The ADA and Failure to Accommodate
When the LAD is unclear, New Jersey courts will “rely on the
federal courts and their construction of federal laws for guidance.”31
Under the ADA:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual on the basis of disability in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.32
This rule has been interpreted to require an “adverse employment
action” for a violation of the statute because “the general rule
established in section (a) qualifies the word ‘discriminate’ with the
phrase ‘in regard to’ and then lists several forms of employmentrelated actions.”33 Thus, the statute suggests that there is a link
between the discrimination and the adverse employment

29
30
31
32
33

Id.
Id.
Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 398 (2010).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
Victor, 203 N.J. at 411.
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consequence.34 This interpretation has not been universally accepted,
however.35
The statute continues, in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b), to define the
phrase “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability” as:
[N]ot making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity.36
The term “disability” under the ADA is defined as “(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”37
The statute explains that “reasonable accommodation” may
consist of “making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities” or “job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to
a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters,
and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”38
Federal courts have interpreted the language of the ADA to
require an employer to engage in an interactive process. For example,
the Third Circuit in Taylor v. Phoenixville School District, relying on a
federal regulation interpreting the ADA,39 reasoned that an employer
must engage in an interactive process.40 The court created a four-factor
34

Marshall v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“As the
language of § 12112(a) makes clear, for discrimination (including denial of reasonable
accommodation) to be actionable, it must occur in regard to some adverse personnel
decision or other term or condition of employment.”).
35
Megan I. Brennan, Need I Prove More: Why an Adverse Employment Action Prong has
no Place in a Failure to Accommodate Disability Claim, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 497, 504–05
(2013) (explaining the different interpretations of the ADA’s language and
concluding that “a more straightforward reading of the ADA leads to the conclusion
that no separate adverse action is necessary.”)
36
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
37
§ 12102.
38
§ 12111.
39
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2012) (“To determine the appropriate reasonable
accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal,
interactive process with the [employee] in need of the accommodation.”).
40
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 318–19 (3d Cir. 1999).
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test to determine whether the employer properly engaged in an
interactive process, which requires the plaintiff to show that
(1) the employer knew about the employee’s disability; (2)
the employee requested accommodations or assistance for
her disability; (3) the employer did not make a good faith
effort to assist the employee in seeking accommodations; and
(4) the employee could have been reasonably
accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.”41
Importantly, however, the court did not suggest that the four factors
“created the entirety of the proofs that a plaintiff must advance in
order to recover under the ADA for a failure to accommodate. Rather,
the opinion established its overall framework by identifying the
elements of the prima facie case for ADA discrimination that all
plaintiffs must prove, including an adverse employment
consequence.”42 Thus, despite introducing the four-factor test for an
interactive process into the analysis, it is not, on its own, legally
significant in that the same overarching framework applies, which
requires the plaintiff to show that:
(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA;
(2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential
functions of the job, with or without reasonable
accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has suffered
an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of
discrimination.43
As the court in Victor explained, “[t]he Taylor decision . . . did not
divorce failure to accommodate from the essential elements of all
other disability discrimination claims; rather, the elements of the
failure to accommodate claim appear as a subset of the second prong
of the ordinary prima facie case.”44
Despite the articulation in Taylor of the prima facie case for failure
to accommodate, the question of whether an adverse employment
consequence is needed remains unsettled among the circuits, namely
the question of whether, under the statute, failing to accommodate a
disability, even without an adverse employment consequence, is itself
actionable because a failure to do so necessarily contravenes the
statute. As one author explained:
To establish a failure to accommodate claim, the plaintiff
41
42
43
44

Id. at 319–20.
Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 415–16 (2010).
Taylor, 184 F.3d at 306.
Victor, 203 N.J. at 416.

OBERGFELL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

6/22/2015 5:11 PM

COMMENT

985

must show he: (1) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA;
(2) the employer is subject to the ADA and on notice of the
disability and need for the accommodation; and (3) that the
employee could perform the essential functions of the
position with a reasonable accommodation. However, there
is a split amongst the courts regarding the remaining
elements. Some courts only require one additional element
– a showing that the defendant failed to reasonably
accommodate the plaintiff. On the other hand, certain
courts mandate that the plaintiff also prove that he suffered
an adverse employment action. In other circuits, it remains
unclear whether an adverse action is necessary to state a
claim. The dispute and confusion is attributable, at least in
part, to parties and courts failing to clearly differentiate
between disparate treatment and failure to accommodate
claims. Although disparate treatment and the failure to
accommodate may sometimes coexist, they are different
types of discrimination. Sometimes this critical distinction
gets lost in the analysis.45
For example, in Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority Police
Department, the court articulated the prima facie case, including the
adverse employment consequence element, but then went on to state
that “[a]dverse employment decisions in this context include refusing
to make reasonable accommodations for a plaintiff’s disabilities.”46
Thus, the court stated that refusal to make an accommodation for an
employee would itself be an adverse employment consequence, and
therefore that no additional adverse employment consequence would
be needed in order to satisfy the prima facie case. It is important to note
that Williams was terminated, clearly an adverse employment
consequence, thereby rendering the adverse employment
consequence discussion dicta.47
The Seventh Circuit has similarly articulated that no adverse
employment consequence would be necessary under the ADA. In
Stevens v. Illinois Department of Transportation, the court stated the prima
facie case as requiring plaintiff to prove: “(1) that she is disabled; (2)
that she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the
job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that the
employer took an adverse job action against her because of her

45
46
47

Brennan, supra note 35, at 500–02.
Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 758.
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disability or failed to make a reasonable accommodation.”48 Finally, an
Illinois district court also rejected any need for proof of an adverse
employment consequence for a claim of failure to accommodate
under the ADA.49 The court stated that the ADA cannot be read to
create “employer liability only if the employee suffered an adverse
employment action because of his disability. Under this construction
an employer would not be liable in situations where known disabilities
are not accommodated simply for management’s laziness or cost
benefit analysis.”50 The court concluded that an employer “cannot
escape liability under the ADA just because its failure to accommodate
did not result in an adverse employment action.”51 Other circuits,
however, have continued to require proof of an adverse employment
consequence.52
C. New Jersey Case Law Leading up to the Victor Decision
Prior to Victor, published opinions in New Jersey recited three
elements of a prima facie case for failure to accommodate: “(1) the
plaintiff had a LAD handicap; (2) was qualified to perform the
essential functions of the job, with or without accommodation; and (3)
suffered an adverse employment action because of the handicap.”53
Thus, New Jersey case law prior to Victor included the adverse
employment consequence element in the analysis. In Tynan v. Vicinage
13 of Superior Court,54 the Appellate Division adopted the Taylor court’s
requirement that an employer must engage in an interactive process.55
The court implemented the four-factor test articulated in Taylor.56
Thus, the analysis under the LAD is very similar to that under the ADA.

48

Stevens v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 210 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2000) (emphasis
added).
49
Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 259 F. Supp. 2d 716, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
50
Id. at 724.
51
Id.
52
See, e.g., Fenney v. Dakota, Minn. & R.R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 716 (8th Cir. 2003)
(a plaintiff must demonstrate he or she suffered from an adverse employment
consequence in order to “overcome . . . initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case”).
53
Bosshard v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 345 N.J. Super. 78, 91 (App. Div.
2001).
54
Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Super. Ct., 351 N.J. Super. 385, 400 (App. Div. 2002).
55
Tynan, 351 N.J. Super. at 400–401; see also Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596,
613 (App. Div. 2008).
56
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 319 (3d Cir. 1999).
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D. Victor v. State
As aforementioned, Victor presented facts in which the failure to
accommodate was unaccompanied by any other adverse employment
consequence. The plaintiff, Roy Victor, a New Jersey State Trooper,
suffered a back injury in 1995 and, because of complications with his
back and a stress-related disorder, was on and off of medical leave for
lengthy periods between 1995 and 2003.57 In December of 2003, Victor
returned to “full-duty” status, which as a “Trooper I” required him to
be “on road patrol” and wear a protective vest.58 When Victor returned
to work on December 11, he told his Assistant Station Manager,
Sergeant O’Rourke, that he had re-injured his back between being
cleared for “full-duty” status and returning for work.59 Victor told
O’Rourke that he wanted to perform administrative tasks instead of his
normal duties because he believed the protective vest would aggravate
his back injury.60 The Station Commander, to whom the matter was
ultimately referred, confirmed that Victor had been cleared for full
duty status and required Victor to undertake his normal duties.61
Victor did not “request sick leave, ask that he be permitted to visit the
division doctor, or produce anything to document his claim that he
was injured, but instead put on his protective vest and went out on road
patrol.”62 Victor took sick leave for the final two hours of his shift and
later saw two division doctors. Victor was later placed on off-duty status
due to depression and stress, but no documentation was produced to
support his claim of a back injury.63 The issue was the four-hour period
during which Victor claimed he was not accommodated and forced to
undertake his normal duties.64
During the trial, the parties took opposing stances as to whether
an adverse employment consequence was needed to state a failure to
accommodate claim, and the issue was brought before the trial court
in the charge conference.65 Defendants sought to include an adverse
employment consequence element as part of the prima facie case, but
the trial court refused to so instruct the jury.66 The trial court reasoned
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 390 (2010).
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 392.
Id.
Id.
Victor, 203 N.J. at 392.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 393.
Id.
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that if all the other elements are proven, failure to accommodate a
disability is in and of itself an adverse employment action.67 The trial
court re-affirmed this position in denying a post-verdict motion for a
new trial.68
Defendants appealed, arguing that the jury charge omitting the
adverse employment consequence element was flawed.69
The
Appellate Division reversed the trial court and held that an adverse
employment consequence was necessary to establish a prima facie case
for failure to accommodate a disability under the LAD.70 Moreover,
the court specified what may qualify as an adverse employment
consequence, holding that
[A]n employer’s adverse employment action must rise above
something that makes an employee unhappy, resentful or
otherwise cause an incidental workplace dissatisfaction . . .
actions that affect wages, benefits, or result in direct
economic harm qualify . . . [as do] noneconomic actions that
cause a significant, non-temporary adverse change in
employment status or the terms and conditions of
employment.71
The court remanded for a new trial, stating that “the [jury] charge was
legally insufficient as it incorrectly stated the applicable law by failing
to require a finding that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment
action.”72
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted the petition for
certification,73 presumably to provide a definitive answer to whether an
adverse employment consequence is a necessary element of failure to
accommodate under the LAD. But, the court held that even assuming
arguendo that no adverse employment consequence was needed, Victor
still could not establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate
because he could establish neither that he was disabled on the date in
question nor that he had sought a reasonable accommodation.74
Instead of resolving the issue, the court stated:
In spite of our recognition that the broad remedial sweep of
our LAD demands vigilance in our protection of the rights
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 395.
Id. at 393.
Victor, 203 N.J. at 393.
Victor v. State, 401 N.J. Super. 596, 617 (App. Div. 2008).
Id. at 616.
Id. at 617.
Victor v. State, 199 N.J. 542 (2009).
Victor, 203 N.J. at 422–23.
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of persons with disabilities, and as compelling as their plight
is in facing workplace challenges that are uniquely theirs, we
are constrained to refrain from resolving today the question
of whether a failure to accommodate unaccompanied by an
adverse employment consequence may be actionable.75
The court was careful to note that it did not rule “based on [the]
conclusion that there can be no claim for failure to accommodate
absent an adverse employment consequence, because we have found
this record an inappropriate one on which to decide that important
question.”76 Moreover, in dicta, the court stated that the “LAD’s
purposes suggest that we chart a course to permit plaintiffs to proceed
against employers who have failed to reasonably accommodate their
disabilities or who have failed to engage in an interactive process even
if they can point to no adverse employment consequence that
resulted.”77 The court declined to “entirely foreclose the possibility of
circumstances that would give rise to a claim for failure to
accommodate even without an identifiable adverse employment
consequence.”78 After providing this lengthy analysis in dicta, the Court
concluded that “regardless of whether or not there is room in the
LAD’s strong protective embrace of persons with disabilities to
recognize that there may be circumstances in which a failure to
accommodate in and of itself gives rise to a cause of action, this
plaintiff’s claim for failure to accommodate cannot meet the proofs
required on his prima facie case.”79
Thus, Victor created tension by foreshadowing a change in the law
without making a definitive determination on the issue. This has led
to difficulties in interpretation by courts facing claims of failure to
accommodate in later cases.
III. APPLICATION OF VICTOR IN LATER NEW JERSEY CASES ALLEGING
FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE
After Victor, two competing lines of cases developed in
interpreting the requirements for a prima facie case of failure to
accommodate under the LAD. Some of the cases rely on the published
opinions in New Jersey issued before the Victor decision which include
the adverse employment consequence element in the prima facie case.
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at 422.
Id. at 424–25.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 425.
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Others, however, have relied on the language in Victor, suggesting that
no additional adverse employment consequence is necessary. The
latter line of cases interprets Victor as a de facto elimination of the
adverse employment consequence element.
A. Adverse Employment Consequence Required
The first line of cases has read the language in Victor as dicta and
has continued to apply the adverse employment consequence element.
For example, in Zack v. State,80 the Appellate Division considered a case
in which the plaintiff left her position voluntarily and had to rely on a
theory of constructive discharge to meet the adverse employment
consequence element of the prima facie case.81 In Zack, the plaintiff,
after striking her head on a metal cabinet, suffered from postconcussion syndrome and hypersensitivity to light and certain odors,
in addition to cognitive impairment and migraines.82 The employer
accommodated the plaintiff by relocating her workstation away from
the windows and removing the light fixture from her cubicle.83 The
plaintiff was ultimately moved to a new floor, where she complained
that a cubicle about twelve feet from her workspace was reconfigured,
which caused additional light to enter her cubicle.84 Plaintiff’s
continued opposition to lighting in the office space was deemed
unreasonable, causing her to ultimately submit her resignation.85
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants,
holding that “defendants had reasonably accommodated plaintiff’s
disability [and that] the plaintiff suffered no adverse employment
action.”86 The Appellate Division considered two issues on appeal,
namely “whether defendants provided a ‘reasonable accommodation’
to plaintiff; and . . . whether plaintiff suffered the adverse employment
action of ‘constructive discharge.’”87 The Appellate Division, in its
analysis, stated that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Victor, left open
the “important question” of “whether an adverse employment
consequence is an essential element of a plaintiff’s claim that his
employer discriminated against him by failing to accommodate his

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87

No. A-3414-09T3, 2012 WL 832611 (App. Div. Mar. 14, 2012).
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Zack, 2012 WL 832611, at *3.
Id. at *4.
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disability.”88 Importantly, the court stated that “[d]espite Victor’s legacy
of uncertainty,89 under prevailing legal standards, the third element of
a prima facie for employment discrimination based on disability
requires plaintiff to show she suffered an adverse employment action
due to her handicap.”90 Thus, because the court required the plaintiff
to prove that she suffered an adverse employment consequence,
plaintiff had to rely on a theory of constructive discharge.91 A claim of
constructive discharge creates a high bar for the plaintiff, requiring
her to prove “not merely ‘severe or pervasive’ conduct, but conduct
that is so intolerable that a reasonable person would be forced to resign
rather than continue to endure it.”92 As another court explained,
constructive discharge contemplates “outrageous,” “coercive,” and
“unconscionable” acts.93
The court first held that the defendants routinely complied with
plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation requests except when plaintiff’s
“requests conflicted with work-safety issues.”94 In light of defendants’
repeated compliance with plaintiff’s requests, with only a few,
legitimate exceptions, the court ultimately held that “no rational jury
could find defendants failed to provide plaintiff with a reasonable
accommodation to enable her to perform the essential function of her
job.”95 Importantly, despite the fact that the court’s initial conclusion
was sufficient to uphold the grant of summary judgment, the court, in
the alternative, also held that “[b]ecause plaintiff’s adverse
employment action is directly related to establishing this element of
her prima facie case—that defendants created an intolerable work
environment by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation—this
part of her case likewise fails.”96
Zack is significant because it is an example of the court applying
88

Id. at *3 (citing Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 386, 388 (2010)).
See also Nead v. Union Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm’n, No. A-3149-09T1, 2011 WL
166245, at *9 (App. Div. Jan. 20, 2011) (acknowledging that the court in Victor “strongly
suggested that such a claim may not necessarily require anything more than the failure
to engage in an interactive dialogue with the employee,” but conceding that “the Court
itself noted that this comment was dicta, and left for another day the ultimate
determination”).
90
Zack, 2012 WL 832611, at *4.
91
Id.
92
Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 28 (2002) (citing Jones
v. Aluminum Shapes, Inc., 339 N.J. Super. 412, 428 (App. Div. 2001)).
93
Jones, 339 N.J. Super. at 428.
94
Zack, 2012 WL 832611, at *5.
95
Id. at *5.
96
Id.
89
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the adverse employment consequence element after Victor, requiring
the plaintiff to rely on constructive discharge, a high bar, in order to
establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate. Presumably, had
it been the case in Zack that the plaintiff’s requests for
accommodations were reasonable, the adverse employment
consequence element would have been the dispositive factor denying
her claim for relief.
The next significant case is Alotto v. ECSM Utility Contractors, Inc.97
In Allotto, the plaintiff was a utility locator, and as part of her job she
was required to respond to emergencies beyond regular business
hours.98 Plaintiff suffered from insomnia, and as a result of her
insomnia medication she could not drive a vehicle and could not be
on-call.99 Plaintiff requested to be removed completely from on-call
duty.100 Plaintiff, via e-mail, left her position when her employer
requested a doctor’s note indicating that she could fulfill her
obligations as a utility locator, including the on-call requirement.101
In its analysis, the court included the adverse employment
consequence element, stating that in order to establish a prima facie
case for failure to accommodate, a plaintiff “must make out the first
three elements of the disability discrimination case” and introduce
evidence that they engaged in an interactive process as required by the
court in Taylor.102 Moreover, in a footnote, the court noted that:
[i]n Victor v. State, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered
at length when a plaintiff may bring a failure to
accommodate claim where there was no adverse employment
action apart from the failure to accommodate. Despite its
lengthy analysis of the issue and its recognition of the broad
remedial sweep of the NJLAD, the court ultimately declined
to decide the issue. Therefore, an adverse employment
action remains a required element of a prima facie failure to
accommodate case.103
In Alotto, the lack of an adverse employment consequence was a
key inquiry in the court’s analysis. Much like the plaintiff in Zack,104 the

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

No. 09-1144, 2010 WL 5186127, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2010).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Alotto, 2010 WL 5186127, at *3 n.10 (internal citations omitted).
Zack, 2012 WL 832611, at *11–12.
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plaintiff in Alotto had to rely on a theory of constructive discharge.105
Also like the plaintiff in Zack, the plaintiff could not meet her burden
to establish a constructive discharge. The court held that “Plaintiff told
Defendants that she considered herself fired after Defendants
requested a doctor’s note indicating that Plaintiff could perform the
requirements of her job. No reasonable fact-finder could conclude
that this request amounts to an adverse employment action against
Plaintiff or involves outrageous, coercive or unconscionable
conduct.”106 The court ultimately concluded that “[b]ecause Plaintiff
cannot demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action,
a required element for . . . failure to accommodate claims, summary
judgment will be granted to Defendants.”107
Moreover, in White v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of N.J.,108 the
Appellate Division recognized the current confusion with regard to the
proper articulation of the prima facie case for failure to accommodate
when it stated that an adverse employment consequence is part of a
plaintiff’s proofs; the court, however, noted in a footnote that Victor
“suggested, without deciding, that a plaintiff might be able to establish
a failure-to-accommodate claim without showing a resulting adverse
employment action.”109 The ambiguity was not dispositive in the case,
as it was undisputed that the plaintiff in the case did in fact suffer an
adverse employment consequence.110
Significantly, the court’s
confusion over the requirements could have been problematic if the
adverse employment consequence element were in dispute, as seen in
Alotto and Zack.
Such a case arose before District Court for the District of New
Jersey in Bull v. UPS.111 In Bull, the plaintiff alleged, in part, disability
discrimination under the LAD for being terminated after being
assigned to light duty by her doctor after she sustained an injury in the
workplace.112 The plaintiff testified at trial that she arrived at work one
morning and was told that she would no longer be an employee at

105

Alotto, 2010 WL 5186127, at *3.
Id.
107
Id.
108
No. A-6333-11T4, 2013 N.J. Super. LEXIS 2169, at *6 (App.Div. Aug. 30, 2013).
109
Id. at *6 n.3.
110
Id.
111
Bull v. UPS, No. 07-2291 (KM)(MCA) 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89077 (D.N.J. July
1, 2014)
112
Id. at *7–8.
106
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UPS.113 The jury found in favor of UPS.114 The verdict form, however,
indicated that the jury believed that Bull suffered from a disability, that
she was performing her job prior to her alleged termination date, that
she was able to perform the essential functions of her position, that
UPS was aware of her need for an accommodation, that a reasonable
accommodation existed, and that UPS “wrongfully did not make such
a reasonable accommodation.”115 The jury, however, did not find that
Bull was terminated, and as such she could not have been terminated
on the basis of her disability.116 Bull challenged the verdict, via a
motion for new trial, on the grounds that the jury verdict sheet was
inadequate.117 Thus, the court was set to confront the issue of “whether
any error in the verdict sheet here affected Ms. Bull’s substantial rights
by inadequately or incorrectly guiding the jury’s findings as to essential
issues.”118 Underlying this question was the issue left unresolved in
Victor; namely, whether a jury finding of an adverse employment action
was necessary, because if not, plaintiff could succeed on a theory of
failure to accommodate. Indeed, the court recognized that Ms. Bull’s
“arguments boil down to a contention that termination of
employment . . . is a superfluous consideration . . . [and that] [f]ailure
to accommodate . . . is itself sufficient to make her case.”119
The district court relied on a pre-Victor, 1998 case, Seiden v. Marina
Associates,120 for the recitation of the prima facie case for failure to
accommodate,
which
required
an
adverse
employment
consequence.121 The court stated that “at least thus far, the New Jersey
courts have never merged the two elements of failure to accommodate
and adverse employment action.”122 The court then addressed Victor,
and explained that the New Jersey Supreme Court “acknowledged the
possibility of an actionable failure to accommodate despite the lack of
any ‘identifiable’ adverse action . . . [but] did not rule affirmatively.”123
Therefore, the court concluded that “[a]bsent a state Supreme Court
decision, the case law cited above [i.e. Seiden], which is contrary to
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id. at *8.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Bull, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89077 at *15.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *23.
315 N.J. Super. 451 (1998)
Bull, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89077 at *18.
Id. at *30.
Id.
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plaintiff’s position, is my best guide. I can discern no trend that would
allow me to predict confidently that the New Jersey Supreme Court
would decide this issue in a manner favoring plaintiff here.”124 The
court then went on to address other weaknesses in plaintiff’s argument
on its way to denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.125
Thus, Zack and Alotto are significant cases because each continued
to apply the adverse employment consequence element, despite the
language in Victor strongly suggesting that no additional adverse
employment consequence would be necessary. In Alotto, the plaintiff’s
case hinged on proof of an adverse employment consequence and, in
both Zack and Alotto, the plaintiff could not carry the high burden of a
constructive discharge. Moreover, the district court’s opinion in Bull
directly addressed the tension resulting from Victor’s ambiguity, and
took the position that despite the New Jersey Supreme Court’s strong
suggestion in dicta, an adverse employment consequence is still a
required proof as part of plaintiff’s prima facie case.
B. Adverse Employment Consequence Not Required
Since the Victor decision, several courts have interpreted the
decision as separating the need for an adverse employment
consequence from the prima facie case of failure to accommodate. For
example, in Whalen v. New Jersey Manufacturer’s Insurance Co., the court
stated that “[i]n Victor, the Court recognized that a plaintiff could
bring a failure-to-accommodate claim where there was no adverse
employment action apart from the failure to accommodate.”126 This
language in Whalen is significant because the court read Victor as
dispensing with the third element of the prima facie case for failure to
accommodate. While the plaintiff in the case suffered an adverse
employment consequence, rendering the issue moot, the court still
acknowledged, albeit in dicta, that Victor stood for the proposition that
no adverse employment consequence is necessary. Similarly, in
Fronczkiewicz v. Magellan Health Services, Inc., the court made a similar
error in stating that Victor allows “plaintiffs ‘to proceed against
employers who have failed to reasonably accommodate their
disabilities or who have failed to engage in an interactive process even
if they can point to no adverse employment consequence that
resulted.’”127
124
125
126
127

Id. at *30–31.
Id. at *34–35.
2012 WL 3166601, at *19 n.4 (N.J. App. Div. Aug. 6, 2012).
No. 11-7542, 2012 WL 2357484, at *2 n.5 (D.N.J. June 20, 2012) (quoting Victor

OBERGFELL (DO NOT DELETE)

996

6/22/2015 5:11 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:977

Some courts have simply omitted the adverse employment
consequence element in their articulation of the prima facie case. For
example, in Schellenberger v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., the court, citing
Victor, articulated the prima facie case as follows: “A claim for failure to
accommodate under the NJLAD requires that the plaintiff establish
both that he was disabled within the meaning of the statute, and sought
a reasonable accommodation that would to allow him to perform the
essential functions of the position.”128 Conspicuously missing in the
courts articulation of the prima facie case was the adverse employment
consequence element.129
Thus, in this line of cases, two of the courts, to wit, the Whalen and
Fronczkiewicz courts, cited Victor as standing for the proposition that a
claim of failure to accommodate required no additional adverse
employment consequence. Other decisions, by contrast, omit the
adverse employment consequence element, citing Victor. Thus, each
of these decisions relies on Victor for the proposition that no adverse
employment consequence is necessary to establish a prima facie case for
failure to accommodate under the LAD.
IV. AN ARGUMENT FOR THE COURT TO TAKE A DEFINITIVE STAND AND
DECLARE THAT FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE REQUIRES NO ADVERSE
EMPLOYMENT CONSEQUENCE
As the discussion of the case law in Part III illustrates, there is
uncertainty in application of the court’s decision in Victor. This
ambiguity stems from the court’s strong suggestion in dicta that under
the right factual circumstances no adverse employment consequence
would be necessary, while at the same time failing to make a definitive
ruling on the issue. This inconsistency demands that the court grant
certification to provide a definitive answer to the question. The lack
of a uniform standard has already led to inconsistent application and
divergent results.130 While the courts that have misapplied the holding
in Victor have done so only in dicta,131 namely in cases in which there
was an adverse employment consequence, there is danger in
misapplication in future circumstances. The need for clarity in the law
v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 421 (2010)).
128
No. 10-2398, 2011 WL 5416432, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2011).
129
See also St. Cyr v. Brandywine Senior Living, LLC, No. 10-5868, 2012 WL 2344858
(D.N.J. June 20, 2012) (similarly omitting the adverse employment consequence
element and citing Victor, 203 N.J. 383); Del Vecchio v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 2014 N.J.
Super. LEXIS 2039, at *19 (App. Div. Aug. 15, 2014) (same).
130
See supra Part III.
131
See e.g., Whalen, 2012 WL 3166601, at *1; Fronczkiewicz, 2012 WL 2357484, at *1.
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extends beyond just the confines of the courtroom: the Victor decision
has implications for employers’ human resources departments, as the
Victor decision can be read to impart greater significance on the
interactive process, which has not heretofore been sufficient, on its
own, to impose liability on the employer.132 The Victor decision, given
its lengthy analysis of an otherwise moot issue in the case, while failing
to definitively provide binding precedent, has left judges, employers,
and employees in a difficult predicament, namely whether to rely on
the longstanding requirement of an adverse employment
consequence, or, to read the proverbial tea leaves, and plan for the
likely outcome that an adverse employment consequence will not be
required.133 Thus, the question of what the correct standard is requires
immediate attention. The decision has implications for employers,
employees, and courts. While there are strong arguments for both
approaches, this comment argues that due to the broad construction
of the LAD, and as a matter of public policy, the court in Victor was
correct to suggest that no additional adverse employment
consequence should be necessary.
In Victor, the court stated that “we . . . cannot entirely foreclose
the possibility of circumstances that would give rise to a claim for
failure to accommodate even without an identifiable adverse
employment consequence.”134 While Victor’s case was “a poor vehicle
in which to find the definitive answer”135 to the question, the court was
correct to leave the possibility open that such factual circumstances
132

See 21 No. 12 ADA Compliance Guide Newsletter (explaining that “[e]mployers
in New Jersey may be held liable for failing to engage in the interactive process of
finding an accommodation for an employee with a disability, even if the employee is
not subject to an adverse action. . . .”)
133
See, e.g., 19 No. 1 N.J. Emp. L. Letter 4.
[The Victor] decision is striking because of the court’s willingness to
analyze in thorough detail an issue that it eventually decided was moot.
While the outcome was a victory for the state police, the decision is likely
to make failure-to-accommodate claims more difficult to defend against
in the future. While the New Jersey Supreme Court felt it couldn’t
deliver a binding decision on whether failure-to-accommodate claims
must include an adverse employment action, it left little question that it
believes an adverse action is necessary. Given that all of the justices
joined in the opinion, any New Jersey court addressing the issue will
likely follow the nonbinding but forceful opinion delivered in this case.
As a result, you should be all the more careful in considering of your
employees’ reasonable accommodation requests and engaging in the
interactive process with them.
Id.
134
Victor, 203 N.J. at 422.
135
Id.
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may exist.
A. Legislative Intent and Supporting Case Law
The legislative intent of the LAD is best served by allowing an
employee “whose requests are not addressed or are denied, and who
continue[s] nonetheless to toil on”136 to have a proper remedy. As
mentioned above, in passing the LAD, the New Jersey Legislature
found that “practices of discrimination against any of its inhabitants,
because of . . . disability . . . are matters of concern to the government
of the state.”137 Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated
that it is the “clear public policy of th[e] State . . . to abolish
discrimination in the work place” and that the overarching goal of the
LAD is the “eradication ‘of the cancer of discrimination.’”138 The Victor
court noted that while the question of whether a failure to
accommodate without an adverse employment consequence is
unsettled at the federal level, “our LAD’s broad remedial purposes and
the wide scope of its coverage for disabilities as compared to the ADA
support an expansive view of protecting rights of persons with
disabilities in the workplace.”139 The court went on to make a more
definitive statement that “[t]he LAD’s purposes suggest that we chart
a course to permit plaintiffs to proceed against employers who have
failed to reasonably accommodate their disabilities or who have failed
to engage in an interactive process even if they can point to no adverse
employment consequence that resulted.”140 Various courts prior to the
Victor decision had emphasized the broad scope of the LAD in
comparison with the ADA.141
Thus, as the legislative findings and case law suggest, the LAD was
intended to cast a wide net and provide broad protections against
discrimination. The broad, remedial nature of the LAD supports the
court’s suggestion that an employer’s failure to accommodate the
disability of an employee contravenes the legislature’s intent. A rule
136

Id. at 421.
See text supra accompanying note 13.
138
Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334 (1988).
139
Victor, 203 N.J. at 420–21.
140
Id.; see Panettieri v. C. V. Hill Refrigeration, 159 N.J. Super. 472, 483 (App. Div.
1978) (“Since the inception of the Law Against Discrimination . . . our courts have
repeatedly recognized its humanitarian concerns, its remedial nature and the liberal
construction to be accorded it.”)
141
See, e.g., Soules v. Mount Holiness Mem’l Park, 354 N.J. Super. 569, 574 (App.
Div. 2002) (“LAD’s definition of handicap, and its scope, is not comparable to the
definitions and scope of handicap or disability under the ADA”).
137
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allowing no cause of action for an employee who is not accommodated
but suffers no adverse employment consequence would create a
situation in which the employer may choose not to provide an
accommodation to the employee so long as the failure to do so does
not rise to the level of a constructive discharge142 or hostile work
environment.143 As the Victor court noted, there may be “circumstances
in which such an employee’s proofs, while falling short of [the hostile
work environment] standard, would cry out for a remedy.”144 The LAD
seeks “to secure to handicapped individuals full and equal access to
society, bounded only by the actual physical limits that they cannot
surmount.”145 Thus, allowing this additional, albeit narrow, protection
for employees would be consistent with the purposes and construction
of the LAD because it would further eradicate discrimination against
disabled individuals. Even if a handicapped employee suffers no
adverse employment consequence, if his or her disability is not
reasonably accommodated by the employer, he or she would
nonetheless be precluded from enjoying “full and equal access to
society.”146
B. The Scope of the LAD and ADA
Under the ADA, an employer is required to provide not only an
accommodation to “enable an individual with a disability who is
qualified to perform the essential functions of that position,”147 but also
“[m]odifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity’s
employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of
employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees
without disabilities.”148 This includes “making the workplace readily

142

See text supra accompanying note 92 (noting the high bar for constructive
discharge).
143
New Jersey courts have “specifically adopted the ‘severe or pervasive’ test as part
of its comprehensive standard,” which conforms to the Title VII analysis at the federal
level. Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 498 (1998) (citing Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc.,
132 N.J. 587, 606 (1993)); see Dorfman v. Pine Hill Bd. of Educ., 346 F. App’x 825,
828–29 (3d Cir. 2009) (articulating the test for hostile work environment under the
LAD: “employee must show that the employer’s conduct: (1) would not have occurred
but for the employee’s protected characteristic; and the conduct was (2) severe or
pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable person believe that (4) the conditions of
employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or abusive.”).
144
Victor, 203 N.J. at 421–22.
145
Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 89 N.J. 483, 492 (1982).
146
Id.
147
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (2014).
148
§ 1630.2(o)(1)(iii).
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accessible to and usable by people with disabilities.”149 The employer
is responsible under Title I “for making facilities accessible to qualified
applicants and employees with disabilities as a reasonable
accommodation . . . .”150 Thus, the reasonable accommodation
requirement under the ADA goes beyond just simply providing an
accommodation to perform one’s job; it also requires accessibility to
the facilities in the building,151 even if not providing such accessibility
would not rise to the level of a constructive discharge.
The language in the regulation supplementing the LAD also
states that a reasonable accommodation includes “[m]aking facilities
used by employees readily accessible and usable by people with
disabilities.”152 It follows that a claim of failure to accommodate should
not have to be linked to an adverse employment consequence in order
to be actionable. Taking, for example, a hypothetical situation of the
HIV-positive reporter who was using an electric scooter because of
fatigue from walking:153 a failure to provide the ramp would likely be
an actionable claim, regardless of whether or not there was an adverse
employment consequence attached to it. The same principles apply to
the LAD, which endeavors not only to provide disabled employees with
the minimum required accommodation to allow them to perform the
functions of the position, but also to allow equal access to society.154
Thus, a mandated link between the failure to accommodate and an
adverse employment consequence undercuts the goals of the LAD and
prevents disabled persons from receiving equal treatment.
Moreover, as the court in Nawrot v. CPC International suggested in
the context of the ADA, requiring an adverse employment
consequence “creates employer liability only if the employee suffered
an adverse employment action because of his disability,” shielding the
employer from liability “where known disabilities are not
149

U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, THE ADA: YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS AN
EMPLOYER, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/ada17.html (last modified Aug. 1,
2008).
150
Id.
151
See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PERSONS WITH HIV/AIDS, available at
http://www.ada.gov/archive/hivqanda.txt (last visited Feb. 28, 2015) (citing as an
example of a reasonable accommodation a situation where “[a]n HIV-positive
newspaper editor who tired easily from walking began to use an electric scooter to get
around. His employer installed a ramp at the entrance to the building in which the
editor worked so that the editor could use his scooter at the office.”).
152
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:13-2.5(b)(1)(i) (2015).
153
See supra note 151.
154
Lasky v. Borough of Hightstown, 426 N.J. Super. 68, 75 (App. Div. 2012).
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accommodated simply for management’s laziness or cost benefit
analysis.”155 Again, such a scheme would cut against the goals of the
LAD and would serve only to shift the burden to the party least able to
guard against abuse. If an employee has no cause of action where his
or her employer’s failure to accommodate does not rise to the level of
a constructive discharge, the employer has no incentive to provide a
reasonable accommodation so long as no other adverse employment
consequence follows. In contrast, allowing such a cause of action
would leverage the risk of litigation against the employer, who would
then be more compelled to offer the accommodation where it is
needed.
C. The Interactive Process
A major possible implication of the Victor decision is that if,
indeed, no adverse employment consequence is required, the
interactive process becomes more significant. As discussed supra,156 the
interactive process was not an independent source of liability under
the LAD; instead, it was a consideration of the second prong of the
prima facie case looking to the employee’s ability to perform the
essential functions of the position. The interactive process requires
the employer to consider whether a reasonable accommodation would
be possible before terminating or failing to hire an employee.157 In
Tynan, the Appellate Division, looking to the ADA for guidance,
concluded that an employer’s bad faith in failing to engage in an
interactive process with an employee may impose liability on the
employer.158 Combining the Tynan decision with the possible
implications of Victor, an employee may prevail on a claim of failure to
accommodate when an employer knows about an employee’s disability
and fails to engage in an interactive process.
Consider, for example, the facts of Victor. If no adverse
employment consequence was necessary, and the facts were such that
Victor could establish that he was disabled, the determination of
whether his employer engaged in an interactive process becomes an
important, dispositive question.159 Indeed, had Victor established that
he was disabled, it is possible that the case would have been decided in
155

Nawrot v. CPC Int’l, 259 F. Supp. 2d 716, 724 (N.D. Ill. 2003); see supra note 49
and accompanying text.
156
See supra Part II.B.
157
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:13-2.5(b)(2).
158
Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Super. Ct., 351 N.J. Super. 385, 400–04 (App. Div. 2002).
159
See generally Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383 (2010).

OBERGFELL (DO NOT DELETE)

1002

6/22/2015 5:11 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:977

his favor, as he made his request for an accommodation clear to his
employer and his supervisor did not examine possible
accommodations, but rather required Victor to perform his normal
duties in spite of his disability.160
D. The Remedy Issue
The question remains that even if a cause of action is allowed for
failure to accommodate absent an adverse employment consequence,
what remedy would the employee be entitled to? Normally, an
employee may file a complaint with the New Jersey Division of Civil
Rights (“DCR”) or in the Superior Court.161 The legislature has
authorized compensatory and punitive damages,162 in addition to
damages for emotional distress.163 The legislature held that:
[B]ecause of discrimination, people suffer personal
hardships, and the State suffers a grievous harm. The
personal hardships include: economic loss; time loss;
physical and emotional stress; and in some cases severe
emotional trauma, illness, homelessness or other irreparable
harm resulting from the strain of employment controversies;
relocation, search and moving difficulties; anxiety caused by
lack of information, uncertainty, and resultant planning
difficulty; career, education, family and social disruption;
and adjustment problems, which particularly impact on
those protected by this act. Such harms have, under the
common law, given rise to legal remedies, including
compensatory and punitive damages. The Legislature
intends that such damages be available to all persons
protected by this act and that this act shall be liberally
construed in combination with other protections available
under the laws of this State.164
Moreover, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us,
explained that a plaintiff need not demonstrate serious psychological
160

Id. at 391–92.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13 (1990).
162
Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, 132 N.J. 587, 610 (N.J. 1993); But see Maczik v. Gilford
Park Yacht Club, 271 N.J. Super. 439, 453 (App. Div. 1994) (explaining that punitive
damages may not be awarded in administrative proceedings, but qualifying that “while
common law punitive damages are not available, the Director can award treble
economic damages for certain discriminatory conduct and can assess statutory
penalties”).
163
See Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 76–78 (2004) (explaining that the “LAD permits
a lower evidentiary threshold” than Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress,
allowing emotional distress damages even without expert testimony).
164
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (2007).
161
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harm in order to recover, nor must a plaintiff establish economic loss,
all that is required is a plaintiff prove that he or she was discriminated
against.165 Punitive damages are awarded under the LAD only when
the conduct is egregious; i.e., “only in the event of actual participation
by upper management or willful indifference.”166 The court will look
for wanton and reckless conduct when deciding whether punitive
damages are appropriate.167
In a case of failure to accommodate absent an adverse
employment consequence, many of the aforementioned damages will
not be applicable. The employee will not have lost his or her position,
will not have been demoted, and will not have suffered any permanent
change in employment. Thus, there will be no real occasion to award
compensatory damages for economic loss. It is possible that damages
for emotional distress may be applicable. As aforementioned, a claim
of emotional distress under the LAD is not as burdensome as a claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.168 The New Jersey
Supreme Court has stated that “[u]nderlying the LAD’s expansive
language advocating the elimination of discrimination is also the
directive that we compensate victims for economic and noneconomic
injuries attributable to an employer’s discriminatory conduct.”169 The
court has recognized that to “suffer humiliation, embarrassment and

165

Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 610 (“The plaintiff’s injury need be no more tangible or
serious than that the conditions of employment have been altered . . . . Although the
LAD provides for compensatory and punitive damages, it is not primarily a tort
scheme; rather, its primary purpose is to end discrimination. Because discrimination
itself is the harm that the LAD seeks to eradicate, additional harms need not be shown
in order to state a claim under the LAD.”)
166
Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 313–14 (1995) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
167
See Levinson v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 868 F.2d 558, 562 (3d Cir. 1989) (citations
omitted) (reviewing the LAD and concluding that “we feel certain that the court would
in some cases find that employment discrimination was wantonly reckless or malicious
conduct reflecting intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an evil-minded act or a
disregard of the rights of another, the type of conduct which it has held may justify an
award of punitive damages”).
168
See Tarr, 181 N.J. at 82 (holding that “compensatory damages for emotional
distress, including humiliation and indignity resulting from willful discriminatory
conduct, are remedies that require a far less stringent standard of proof than that
required for a tort-based emotional distress cause of action. We hold that in
discrimination cases, which by definition involve willful conduct, the victim may
recover all natural consequences of that wrongful conduct, including emotional
distress and mental anguish damages arising out of embarrassment, humiliation, and
other intangible injuries.”).
169
Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
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indignity is by definition to suffer emotional distress”170 and that the
victim of discrimination should be allowed to recover “without
corroborative proof, permanency of response, or other physical or
psychological symptoms rendering the emotional distress severe or
substantial.”171 Thus, the remedy for a claim of failure to accommodate
can result in a recovery for emotional distress. The court has made
clear that noneconomic injuries are compensable under the LAD and
that the broad, remedial nature of the statute seeks to provide a
remedy to victims of discrimination, even if the claim does not rise to
the level of a tort-based claim for emotional distress.172 Also, punitive
damages may result if the failure to accommodate the disability is done
maliciously or wantonly.173
As Lehmann made clear, it is important to separate the damages
inquiry from the question of liability. A plaintiff must decide whether,
given the circumstances of his or her case, bringing suit is in his or her
best interest. Given the broad, protective embrace of the LAD and its
desire to eliminate all forms of discrimination, however, it seems
counterintuitive to bar these claims from moving forward simply
because, in some cases, there may not be extensive damages to collect.
E. Protections for Employer
A possible counterargument to dispensing with the adverse
employment consequence element is that allowing a cause of action
for failing to accommodate a disability would open the floodgates to
increased litigation and tenuous claims in what is already a very
litigious area of law.174 While it is true that such a holding would open
up more potential liability for the employer, the regulations, as well as
procedural mechanisms, offer the employer sufficient protection from
liability. Moreover, as the court in Victor suggested, most cases
involving a claim of failure to accommodate will have some sort of
adverse employment consequence attached to them.175 Thus, the fear
170

Id. at 81 (citation omitted).
Id.
172
Id. at 82.
173
Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 610.
174
See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, More Workers Complain of Bias on the Job, a Trend
Linked to Widespread Layoffs, N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/01/12/business/12bias.html?_r=0; see also Disability-related employment
discrimination claims increased in 2012, THE ARC (Feb. 4, 2013),
http://insider.thearc.org/2013/02/04/disability-related-employmentdiscrimination-claims-increased-in-2012/.
175
Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 421 (2010) (“Such cases would be unusual, if not
rare, for it will ordinarily be true that a disabled employee who has been unsuccessful
171
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of increase in litigation if a cause of action is permitted for employees
who are not accommodated absent an adverse employment
consequence is tempered by the reality that such a factual
circumstance will be rare, and that most cases involving a claim of
failure to accommodate will involve an adverse employment
consequence.
In addition, procedural safeguards have been established for
employers. A plaintiff must make a threshold showing that he or she is
disabled within the meaning of the statute. New Jersey courts have
continuously made clear that the burden rests with the plaintiff to
establish each element of the prima facie case in employment
discrimination claims.176 The employee must first prove that he or she
is disabled within the meaning of the LAD.177 In order to initiate the
interactive process, a plaintiff must make the need for an
accommodation known to his or her employer.178 This proved to be an
important factor in the Victor case itself. The fact that Victor could not
prove that he was disabled on the date when he requested an
accommodation shielded the defendants from liability and effectively
rendered the adverse employment consequence element irrelevant.179

Second, New Jersey courts have made clear that in order to prevail
on a claim of failure to accommodate, the employee must show that he
or she was capable of performing the essential functions of his or her
position.180 As part of this analysis, the court will require a plaintiff to
“make a facial showing that his proposed accommodation was possible,
and that the costs associated with the accommodation were not clearly
disproportionate to the benefits.”181 If a plaintiff makes this showing,
the employer gets the opportunity “to prove as an affirmative defense
in securing an accommodation will indeed suffer an adverse employment
consequence.”).
176
Id. at 408 (“All employment discrimination claims require the plaintiff to bear
the burden of proving the elements of a prima facie case.”).
177
Bosshard v. Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 345 N.J. Super. 78, 91 (App. Div.
2001).
178
See Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Super. Ct., 351 N.J. Super. 385, 400 (App. Div. 2002).
179
Victor, 203 N.J. at 422.
180
See id. at 410 (noting that the second element of the prima facie case for a claim
of disability discrimination requires the plaintiff to prove “that he or she is qualified
to perform the essential functions of the job, or was performing those essential
functions, either with or without a reasonable accommodation”) (citation omitted).
181
Boyce v. Lucent Techs., 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1680, at *14 (App. Div.
June 21, 2007).
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that the requested accommodation was unreasonable.”182
For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held that a
request for permanent light duty work rendered the employee unable
to fulfill the essential functions of the position.183 Moreover, New Jersey
courts have held that “reasonably regular, reliable, and predictable
attendance is a necessary element of most jobs. An employee who does
not come to work cannot perform any of her job functions, essential
or otherwise.”184 The employee may not proceed with a claim of failure
to accommodate if he or she is unable to perform the essential
functions of his or her particular position even with the requested
accommodation.185

Third, the LAD similarly makes clear that the employer need not
provide an accommodation that imposes an undue hardship on the
employer.186 The statute states that a determination of undue hardship
is made on a case-by-case basis and points to several factors to guide
the determination.187 A defense of undue hardship is considered an
affirmative defense, however, and the burden of proof rests on the
employer.188 Nevertheless, the employer retains the protection under
the statute of demonstrating that an accommodation would impose an
undue hardship, which would absolve the employer from liability for
failing to accommodate. For example, in Gaul v. Lucent Technologies,
182
183

Id. (citing Gaul v. Lucent Techs., 134 F.3d 576, 581 (3d Cir. N.J. 1998).
Raspa v. Office of Sheriff of Cnty. of Gloucester, 191 N.J. 323, 327 (2007).
We hold that an employee must possess the bona fide occupational
qualifications for the job position that employee seeks to occupy in order
to trigger an employer’s obligation to reasonably accommodate the
employee to the extent required by the LAD. In that context, we further
hold that an employer may reasonably limit light duty assignments to
those employees whose disabilities are temporary, and that the
availability of light duty assignments for temporarily disabled employees
does not give rise to any additional duty on the part of the employer to
assign a permanently disabled employee indefinitely to an otherwise
restricted light duty assignment.

Id.
184

Svarnas v. AT&T Commc’ns, 326 N.J. Super. 59, 78 (App. Div. 1999) (citations
omitted).
185
See Ensslin v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 275 N.J. Super. 352, 367 (App. Div. 1994)
(finding that essential functions of the position, namely “apprehension and securing
of suspects and prisoners” could not be completed by a police officer who was
paralyzed after an accident).
186
N.J. ADMIN. CODE 13:13-2.5(b) (2015).
187
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
188
Lasky v. Moorestown Twp., 425 N.J. Super. 530, 545 (App. Div. 2012).
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Inc., the Third Circuit found that plaintiff’s request to be transferred
away from co-workers who caused “inordinate stress” was unreasonable
because of the burden it would have on the ability of the employer to
make personnel decisions.189
Thus, while removing the requirement of an adverse employment
consequence as part of the prima facie case exposes employers to more
potential liability, there are adequate safeguards that courts must
faithfully apply to protect employers from frivolous complaints. The
LAD, despite its broad scope, makes clear that an employee is not
entitled to each and every conceivable accommodation.190 As one
author explained:
[e]ven if the Court eventually decides that a disabled
employee need not establish that he or she suffered an
adverse employment consequence as part of the prima
facie LAD case, that employee plaintiff will be hard-pressed to
succeed where the evidence shows that the employer
engaged in the interactive process and offered a reasonable
accommodation, which the employee declined.191
The statute, therefore, only requires employers to act in good faith to
accommodate an employee after becoming aware of an employee’s
disability. By eliminating the need for an adverse employment
consequence, the interactive process becomes very important, as
failure to engage in an interactive process may expose the employer to
liability. An employer may shield itself from liability by engaging in an
interactive process with the disabled employee upon becoming aware
of the employee’s need for an accommodation.
V. CONCLUSION
As the court in Victor suggested, an employee should be permitted
to pursue a cause of action for failure to accommodate a disability even
in the absence of an adverse employment consequence. The broad,
remedial nature of the LAD and the legislature’s goal to eradicate
discrimination and provide disabled persons with full and equal access
189

Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 579 (3d Cir. 1998).
See Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Super. Ct., 351 N.J. Super. 385, 397 (App. Div. 2002)
(citation omitted) (explaining that an “employer’s duty to accommodate extends only
so far as necessary to allow ‘a disabled employee to perform the essential functions of
his job. It does not require acquiescence to the employee’s every demand.’”).
191
Trent S. Dickey & David H. Ganz, Is An Adverse Employment Consequence A
Necessary Element For A Failure To Accommodate Claim In New Jersey?, THE METRO.
CORPORATE COUNSEL 1, 34 (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/
pdf/2010/November/34.pdf.
190
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to society bolsters the argument that a cause of action should be
allowed where an employee is not accommodated but has not suffered
an adverse employment consequence. In addition to dovetailing with
the Legislature’s purpose in enacting the LAD, allowing a cause of
action absent an adverse employment consequence incentivizes
employers to be vigilant and proactive in providing accommodations.
By allowing a cause of action for failure to accommodate a disability,
the employer will be faced with the prospect of litigation, yet will also
be protected by procedural mechanisms in the statute, namely, that
the requested accommodation cannot be unduly burdensome and that
the plaintiff must be able to perform the essential functions of the
position. These protections along with the relatively rare nature of
these types of cases limit the scope of litigation and insulate the
employer from excessive liability. Thus, because of the broad
construction of the LAD, and as a matter of public policy, employees
should be able proceed on a claim of failure to accommodate even
absent an adverse employment consequence.

